Abstract-We propose an approach for constructing secret and private keys based on the long-known Slepian-Wolf code, due to Wyner, for correlated sources connected by a virtual additive noise channel. Our work is motivated by results of Csiszár and Narayan which highlight innate connections between secrecy generation by multiple terminals that observe correlated source signals and Slepian-Wolf near-lossless data compression. Explicit procedures for such constructions and their substantiation are provided. The performance of low-density parity check channel codes in devising a new class of secret keys is examined.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE problem of secrecy generation by multiple terminals, based on their observations of separate but correlated signals followed by public communication among themselves, has been investigated by several authors ( [31] , [2] , [6] , [11] , among others). It has been shown that these terminals can generate secrecy, namely "common randomness" which is kept secret from an eavesdropper that is privy to said public communication and perhaps also to additional "wiretapped" side information. For instance, in [31] and [6] , this is accomplished in three phases termed advantage distillation, information reconciliation and privacy amplification.
Our work is motivated by [12] which studies secrecy generation for multiterminal "source models" with an arbitrary number of terminals, each of which observes a distinct component of a discrete memoryless multiple source (DMMS). Specifically, suppose that terminals observe, respectively, independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) repetitions of finite-valued random variables (rvs) , denoted by , where .
Thereupon, unrestricted and noiseless public communication is allowed among the terminals. All such communication is observed by all the terminals and by the eavesdropper. The eavesdropper is assumed to be passive, i.e., unable to tamper with the public communication of the terminals. In this framework, two models considered in [12] dealing with a secret key (SK) and a private key (PK) are pertinent to our work. (i) Secret key: Suppose that all the terminals in wish to generate a SK, i.e., common randomness which is concealed from the eavesdropper with access to their public communication and which is nearly uniformly distributed. 1 The largest (entropy) rate of such a SK, termed the SK capacity and denoted by , is shown in [12] to equal (1) where (2) with 2
where . (ii) Private key: For a given subset , a PK for the terminals in , private from the terminals in , is a SK generated by the terminals in with the cooperation of the terminals in , which is concealed from an eavesdropper with access to the public interterminal communication and also from the cooperating terminals in (and, hence, private). 3 The largest (entropy) rate of such a PK, termed the PK capacity and denoted by , is shown in [12] to be (4) where (5) 1 In [12] , a general situation is studied in which a subset of the terminals generate a SK with the cooperation of the remaining terminals. 2 Here, denotes a proper subset. 3 A general model is considered in [12] for privacy from a subset of A of the cooperating terminals.
0018-9448/$31.00 © 2012 IEEE with (6) The expressions in (1)- (3) and (4)- (6) afford the following interpretation [12] . The joint entropy in (1) corresponds to the maximum rate of shared common randomness-sans secrecy constraints-that can ever be achieved by the terminals in when each terminal becomes omniscient, i.e., reconstructs all the components of the DMMS with probability as the observation length becomes large. Further, in (2), (3) corresponds to the smallest aggregate rate of interterminal communication that enables every terminal to achieve omniscience [12] . Thus, from (1), the SK capacity , i.e., the largest rate at which all the terminals in can generate a SK, is obtained by subtracting from the maximum rate of shared common randomness achievable by these terminals, viz., , the smallest overall rate of the (data-compressed) interterminal communication that enables all the terminals to become omniscient. A similar interpretation holds for the PK capacity in (4) as well, with the difference that the terminals in , which cooperate in secrecy generation and yet must not be privy to the secrecy they help generate, can be assumed-without loss of generality-to simply "reveal" their observations [12] . Hence, the entropy terms in (1), (3) are now replaced in (4), (6) with additional conditioning on . It should be noted that and are obtained as solutions to multiterminal Slepian-Wolf (SW) (near-lossless) data compression problems not involving any secrecy constraints.
The form of characterization of the SK and PK capacities in (1) and (4) also suggests successive steps for generating the corresponding keys. For instance, and loosely speaking, in order to generate a SK, the terminals in first generate common randomness (without any secrecy restrictions) using SW-compressed interterminal communication denoted collectively by, say, . Thus, the terminals generate rvs , with , which agree with probability for suitably large; suppressing subscripts, let denote the resulting "common" rv where . The second step entails an extraction from of a SK of entropy rate by means of a suitable operation performed identically at each terminal on the acquired common randomness . In particular, when the common randomness acquired by the terminals corresponds to omniscience, i.e., , and is achieved using interterminal communication of the most parsimonious rate in (2) , then the corresponding SK has the best rate given by (1) . It is important to note, however, that as mentioned in [12, Sec. VI] , and already known from [31] and [2] , neither communication by every terminal nor omniscience is essential for generating secrecy (SK or PK) at the best rate; for instance, the rv above need not correspond to omniscience for the SK to have the best possible rate in (1). A similar approach as above can be used to generate a PK of the largest rate in (4).
The discussion above suggests that techniques for SW data compression could be used to devise constructive schemes for obtaining SKs and PKs that achieve the corresponding capacities. Further, in SW data compression, the existence of linear encoders of rates arbitrarily close to the SW bound has been long known [9] . In the special situation when the i.i.d. sequences observed at the terminals are related to each other in probability law through virtual discrete memoryless channels (DMCs) characterized by independent additive noises, such linear SW encoders can be obtained in terms of cosets of linear error correction codes for such virtual channels, a fact first illustrated in [48] for the case of terminals connected by a virtual binary symmetric channel (BSC), and later exploited in most known linear constructions of SW encoders (cf. e.g., [1] , [8] , [16] , [17] , [21] , [23] , [24] , [26] , [27] , [32] , [37] , [43] ). When the i.i.d. sequences observed by terminals are connected by an arbitrary virtual DMC, the corresponding SW data compression can be viewed in terms of coding for a "semisymmetric" channel, i.e., a channel with independent additive noise that is defined over an enlarged alphabet [20] ; the case of stationary ergodic observations at the terminals is also considered therein. These developments in SW data compression can translate into an emergence of new constructive schemes for secrecy generation.
Motivated by these considerations, we seek to devise new constructive schemes for secrecy generation in source models in which SW data compression plays a central role. The main technical contribution of this work is the following: Considering four simple models of secrecy generation, we show how a new class of SKs and PKs can be devised for them at rates arbitrarily close to the corresponding capacities, relying on the SW data compression code in [48] . In all these models, the secrecy capacities are attained with perfect secrecy, i.e., with the corresponding SKs and PKs being exactly independent of the eavesdropper's knowledge and being exactly uniformly distributed. Additionally, we examine the performance of low-density parity check (LDPC) codes in the SW data compression step of the procedure for secrecy generation. Preliminary results of this work have been reported in [49] and [50] . In independent work [33] for the case of terminals which is akin to but different from ours, extraction of a SK from previously acquired common randomness by means of a linear transformation has been demonstrated. Also, in related work, SK generation for a source model with two terminals that observe continuous-amplitude signals, has been studied in [51] , [47] , [34] , [35] , [52] .
We do not consider here the notion of a "wiretap" SK for a multiterminal source model [31] , [2] , [12] . This notion, more restrictive than that of a PK above, obtains when the wiretapped terminals in do not cooperate in secrecy generation; specifically, they do not engage in public discussion. A single-letter characterization of the corresponding capacity of this practically relevant model remains unresolved in general but for partial results and bounds (cf. e.g., [31] , [2] , [38] , [12] , [13] , [19] ). However, it should be mentioned that the source model without a wiretapper, too, is of practical interest; see [51] , [52] .
In recent years, several secrecy generation schemes have been reported, relying on capacity-achieving channel codes, for "wiretap" secrecy models that differ from ours. For instance, it was shown in [45] , [46] that such a channel code can attain the secrecy capacity for any wiretap channel. See also [7] , [25] .
Recently discovered polar channel codes [4] , [5] have been considered for achieving wiretap secrecy capacity; see [29] , [22] , and [3] . The use of polar codes in SK and PK generation for our source models is not considered here.
The paper is organized as follows. Preliminaries are contained in Section II. In Section III, we consider four simple source models for which we provide elementary constructive schemes for SK or PK generation which rely on suitable SW data compression codes; the keys thereby generated are shown to satisfy the requisite secrecy and rate-optimality conditions in Section IV. Implementations of these constructions using LDPC codes are illustrated in Section V which also reports simulation results. Section VI contains closing remarks. [2] , [31] and for terminals in [12] , given by (1); and for in the case of terminals in [2] and for terminals in [12] , given by (4). The proofs of the achievability parts exploit the close connection between secrecy generation and SW data compression. Loosely speaking, common randomness sans any secrecy restrictions is first generated through SW-compressed interterminal communication, whereby all the terminals acquire a (common) rv with probability . In the next step, secrecy is then extracted by means of a suitable identical operation performed at each terminal on the acquired common randomness. When the common randomness initially acquired by the terminals is maximal, the corresponding SK has the best rate given by (1) . In this work, we consider four simple models for which we illustrate the constructions of appropriate perfect SKs or PKs.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Secret Key and Private Key Capacities
B. Linear Codes for the Binary Symmetric Channel
The SW codes of interest will rely on the following classic result concerning the existence of "good" linear channel codes for a BSC. A BSC with crossover probability , , will be denoted by BSC( ). Let denote the binary entropy function.
Lemma 1 [14] : For every , , and for all sufficiently large, there exists a binary linear code for a , with , such that the average error probability of maximum likelihood decoding is less than , for some . Proof: See for instance [42, Th. 4.7] .
C. Types and Typical Sequences
The following standard facts regarding "types" and "typical sequences" and their pertinent properties (cf. e.g., [10] ) are compiled here in brief for ready reference. The following is an independent and explicit statement of the well-known fact that the probability of a nontypical set decays to 0 exponentially rapidly in (cf. e.g., [53, Th. 6.3 
]).
Proposition 1: Given a joint pmf on with , , , for every ,
and (8) for all .
Proof: See Appendix A for a simple proof that is of independent interest.
III. MAIN RESULTS
We now present our main results on SK generation for three specific models, and PK generation for a fourth model. The proofs of the accompanying Theorems 1-4 are provided in Section IV. We show a simple scheme for the terminals to generate a SK with rate close to , which relies on Wyner's well-known method for SW data compression [48] . The SW problem of interest entails terminal 2 reconstructing the observed sequence at terminal 1 from the SW codeword for and its own observed sequence .
Observe that under the given joint pmf (9), can be considered as an input to a virtual , with corresponding output , i.e., we can write (10) where is an i.i.d. sequence of -valued rvs, independent of and with , . (i) SW data compression [48] : Let be a linear code as in Lemma 1 with parity check matrix . Both terminals know (and ). Terminal 1 communicates the syndrome to terminal 2. The maximum likelihood estimate of at terminal 2 is where is the most likely sequence (under the pmf of as above) with syndrome , with denoting addition modulo 2 and denoting transposition. Note that in a standard array corresponding to the code above, is simply the coset leader of the coset with syndrome . Also, and lie in the same coset. We remark that owing to the complexity of generating a standard array for large , the maximum likelihood estimate applying such an array may be replaced in practice by other efficient decoding algorithms (cf. Section V-B).
The probability of decoding error at terminal 2 is given by and it readily follows from (10) that
The following theorem asserts that constitutes a perfect SK with rate approaching SK capacity.
Theorem 1:
Let be given. Then for some and for all sufficiently large, the pair of rvs generated above, with (common) range (say), satisfy
Remark: The probability of differing from equals exactly the average error probability of maximum likelihood decoding when is used on a . Furthermore, the gap between the rate of the generated SK and SK capacity equals the gap between the rate of and channel capacity. Note that Model 1 is a formal special case of Model 2 for . However, we choose to present them separately since the SK construction and proof of achievability of SK capacity for the former are elementary and do not involve typicality arguments unlike the latter.
B. Model 2
We show below a scheme for the terminals to generate a SK with rate close to the (strong) SK capacity for this model [2] , [12] , [31] , which is given by (1) as (i) SW data compression: This step is identical to step (i) for Model 1. Note that under the given joint pmf (15) , and can be written as in (10) . It follows in the same manner as for Model 1 that for some and for all sufficiently large
(ii) SK construction: Both terminals know the linear code as in Lemma 1, and a (common) standard array for . Let denote the set of coset leaders for all the cosets of .
Denote by the set of sequences from in the coset of with coset leader ,
. If the number of sequences of the same type in is more than , where with satisfying in Lemma 1, then collect arbitrarily such sequences to compose a subset, which we term a regular subset (as it consists of sequences of the same type). Continue this procedure until the number of sequences of every type in is less than . Let denote the number of distinct regular subsets of .
Enumerate (in any way) the sequences in each regular subset. Let , where , , , denote the -th sequence of the -th regular subset in the -th coset (with coset leader ).
Terminal 1 sets if equals ; else, is set to be uniformly distributed on , independent of . Terminal 2 sets if equals ; else, is set to be uniformly distributed on , independent of . The following theorem says that constitutes a perfect SK with rate approaching SK capacity.
Theorem 2:
: Let be given. Then for some and for all sufficiently large, the pair of rvs generated above, with range (say), satisfy
C. Model 3
The following model is an instance of a Markov chain on a tree (cf. [18] , [12] ). Consider a tree with vertex set and edge set . For , let denote the set of all vertices connected with by a path containing the edge . The rvs form a Markov chain on the tree if for each , the conditional pmf of given depends only on (i.e., is conditionally independent of , conditioned on ). Note that when is a chain, this concept reduces to that of a standard Markov chain.
Let the terminals observe, respectively, i. Note that under the joint pmf of , , above, we can write (27) where is an i.i.d. sequence of -valued rvs, independent of , with , . Further, plays the role of in Model 1 with in lieu of in the latter. We show below a scheme for terminals 1 and 2 to generate a PK with rate close to (strong) PK capacity for this model [2] , [11] , [12] , given by (4) as The first step of this scheme entails terminal 3 simply revealing its observations to both terminals 1 and 2. Then, Wyner's SW data compression scheme is used for reconstructing at terminal 2 from the SW codeword for and its own knowledge of . (i) SW data compression: This step is identical to step (i) for Model 1, as seen with the help of (27) . Obviously, for some and for all sufficiently large.
(ii) PK construction: ; else, is set to be uniformly distributed on , independent of . The following theorem establishes that constitutes a perfect PK with rate approaching PK capacity.
Theorem 4:
Let be given. Then for some and for all sufficiently large, the pair of rvs generated above, with range (say), satisfy
Remark: The PK construction scheme above applies for any joint pmf satisfying (27) and is not restricted to the given joint pmf in (26) .
IV. PROOFS OF THEOREMS 1-4
Proof of Theorem 1: It follows from the SK construction scheme for Model 1 that which is (11) . Since is uniformly distributed on , we have for , , that Hence i.e., is uniformly distributed on , and so which is (13) . Therefore, (14) holds since . It remains to show that satisfies (12) with . Let be the set of coset leaders for the cosets of . For ,
i.e., is independent of and so , establishing (12) .
Proof of Theorem 2:
Let denote the union of all regular subsets in . Clearly , so that
By Proposition 1, goes to 1 exponentially rapidly in . We show below that decays to 0 exponentially rapidly in .
Since the number of different types of sequences in does not exceed , we have that where the first inequality follows from the specifics of the SK construction for Model 2 in Section III-B, and the second inequality is from . Since , , we get Choosing , goes to 0 exponentially rapidly. Therefore, it follows from (32) that goes to 1 exponentially rapidly in , with exponent depending on . By the SK construction scheme for Model 2
Since
, by the observation in the previous paragraph, we have for some and for all sufficiently large, which is (16).
Next, we shall show that satisfies (18) . For , it is clear by choice that (33) and that (34) (35) where (34) is due to every regular subset consisting of sequences of the same type. From (33) and (35) (36) i.e., is uniformly distributed on , with which is (19) .
It remains to show that satisfies (17) with . For , , we have by choice, and Hence where the previous equality follows from (36) . Thus, is independent of , establishing (17) .
Proof of Theorem 3:
Applying the same arguments used in Theorem 1, we see that the rvs satisfy (22), (24), and (25) . It then remains to show that satisfies (23) Clearly, the first term on the right side of (37) is zero. Since for a fixed , is a function of i.e., is independent of , establishing (23) .
Proof of Theorem 4:
For every , let denote the union of all regular subsets in . Since , (38) It follows from Proposition 1 that goes to 1 exponentially rapidly in . We show below that goes to 0 exponentially rapidly in .
Recall that the number of different joint types of pairs in does not exceed . Thus where the previous inequality is from . Since , , we get Choosing , goes to 0 exponentially rapidly. Therefore, it follows from (38) that goes to 1 exponentially rapidly in , with an exponent depending on .
By the PK construction scheme for Model 4, we have
Since by the observation in the previous paragraph, we have for some and for all sufficiently large, which is (28) .
Next, we shall show that satisfies (30) . For and , it is clear by choice that and that where the second equality is due to every regular subset consisting of sequences of the same joint type with . Therefore (39) i.e., is uniformly distributed on , with which is (31) .
It remains to show that satisfies (29) with . For , and , we have by choice, and Hence where the previous equality follows from (39) . Thus, is independent of , establishing (29) .
V. IMPLEMENTATION WITH LDPC CODES
We outline an implementation using LDPC codes (cf. e.g., [44] , [28] , [39] , [40] ) of the scheme for the construction of a SK for Model 1 in Section III. As will be indicated below, similar implementations can be applied to Models 2-4 as well.
A. SK Construction
Without any loss of generality, we consider a systematic linear code with generator matrix , where is an -identity matrix and is an -matrix. Then, the parity check matrix for is , where is an -identity matrix. The first bits of every codeword in , namely the information bits, are pairwise distinct. Further, since the coset with coset leader , , must contain the sequence , with denoting a sequence of zeros, the first -bit-segments of the sequences in the coset are pairwise distinct. Terminal 1 transmits the syndrome , whereupon terminal 2, knowing , estimates . Since the first bits of the sequences in each coset are pairwise distinct, these bits can serve as the index of a sequence in its coset. Then, terminal 1 (respectively, 2) sets (respectively, ) as the first bits of (respectively, ). The same implementation of the SW data compression scheme above holds for Models 2 and 4, too. It can be applied repeatedly also for the successive estimates (20) in Model 3. In Model 3, (respectively, , ) is set as the first bits of (respectively, ). It should be noted that the current complexity of generating regular subsets in Models 2 and 4 poses a hurdle for explicit efficient constructions of a SK and a PK, respectively, for these models.
B. Simulation Results
We provide simulation results for the tradeoff between the relative secret key rate (i.e., the difference between the SK capacity and the rate of the generated SK) and the rate of generating unequal SKs at different terminals (corresponding to the bit error rate in SK-matching), when LDPC codes are used for SK construction in Model 1.
For the purpose of comparison, three different LDPC codes were used: i) a -regular LDPC code; ii) a -regular LDPC code; and iii) an irregular LDPC code with degree distribution pair (cf. [26] ) with a common codeword length of bits, and up to 60 iterations of the belief-propagation algorithm (cf. [26] ) were allowed. Over blocks were transmitted from terminal 1. Since every linear code is equivalent to a systematic code (cf. e.g., [36] ), the arguments of Section V-A facilitate SK generation.
Simulation results are shown in Figs. 1 and 2 , where conditional entropy (i.e.,
) is plotted against key bit error rate (KBER). We note that in this simulation SKs are generated at fixed rates that are equal to the rates of the LDPC codes used. Since for Model 1, SK capacity equals , the conditional entropy serves as an indicator of the gap between SK capacity and the rate of the generated SK. Fig. 1 shows the performance of the (3, 6)-regular and the irregular LDPC codes; Fig. 2 shows the performance of the (3,4)-regular LDPC code. It is seen in both figures that KBER increases with . Since SK capacity decreases with increasing , an increase of narrows the gap between SK capacity and the rate of the generated SK, but raises the likelihood of generating unequal SKs at the two terminals.
It is seen from Fig. 1 that the irregular LDPC code outperforms the (3,6)-regular LDPC code. For instance, for a fixed crossover probability , say, and , the KBER for the irregular LDPC code is as low as , while the KBER for the (3,6)-regular LDPC code is only about . 
VI. DISCUSSION
We have considered four simple secrecy generation models involving multiple terminals, and propose a new approach for constructing SKs and PKs. This approach is based on Wyner's well-known SW data compression code for sources connected by virtual channels with additive independent noise.
In all the models considered in this paper, the i.i.d. sequences observed at the different terminals possess the following structure: They can be described in terms of sequences at pairs of terminals where each terminal in a pair is connected to the other terminal by a virtual communication channel with additive independent noise. While the correlated sources in all our models have binary alphabets, the approach extends to alphabets that are finite groups.
There are two steps in the SK construction schemes. The first step constitutes SW data compression for the purpose of common randomness generation at the terminals. Although the existence of linear data compression codes with rate arbitrarily close to the SW bound has been long known for arbitrarily correlated sources [9] , constructions of such linear data compression codes are understood in terms of the cosets of linear errorcorrection codes for the virtual channel, say , only when this virtual channel is characterized by (independent) additive noise [48] . For instance, when two terminals are connected by a virtual BSC , a linear data compression code, which attains the SW rate for terminal 2 to reconstruct the signal at terminal 1, is then provided by a linear channel code which achieves the capacity of the BSC . When the i.i.d. sequences observed at terminals 1 and 2 are arbitrarily correlated, the associated virtual communication channel connecting them is no longer symmetric and corresponds to a virtual channel with input-dependent noise. In this case, while linear codes are no longer rate-optimal for the given channel [15] , linear code constructions for a suitably enlarged "semisymmetric" channel that are used for SW data compression [20] could pave the way for devising schemes for SK construction.
The second step in the SK construction schemes involves SK extraction from the previously acquired CR. It has been shown [33] that for the special case of a two-terminal source model, this extraction can be accomplished by means of a linear transformation. However, it is unknown yet whether this holds also for a general source model with more than two terminals.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 We shall prove (7) here. The proof of (8) 
with the previous inequality holding for every in (40) . It follows from (41) and (42) that (43) for all . Finally, observe that (44) which is readily seen from the fact that for each Clearly, (43) and (44) imply (7).
APPENDIX B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
The proof of Proposition 2 relies on the following lemma concerning the average error probability of maximum likelihood decoding.
A sequence is called a descendent of a sequence if implies that , . A subset is called quasiadmissible if the conditions that and is a descendent of together imply that .
Lemma 2 [30] : If is a quasiadmissible subset of , then for where with denoting the Hamming weight of .
For a binary linear code, let denote the set of coset leaders. It is known (cf. [36, Th. 3.11] ) that is a quasiadmissible subset of . If a binary linear code is used on BSC( ), the average error probability of maximum likelihood decoding is given by (cf. [41, Th. 5 
.3.3])
Lemma 2 implies that if the same binary linear code is used on two binary symmetric channels with different crossover probabilities, say, , then the average error probability of maximum likelihood decoding for a is strictly less than that for a ; note that a is a degraded version of a , being a cascade of the latter and a . Returning to the proof of Proposition 2, it follows from Lemma 1 that for some and for all sufficiently large
Recall that and is the path from to . It follows by Lemma 2 that Consequently where the second inequality is due to forming a Markov chain. Continuing this procedure, we have finally that
